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DODD-FRANK’S TITLE II AUTHORITY: A DISORDERLY
LIQUIDATION OF EXPERIENCE, LOGIC, AND DUE PROCESS
Chadwick Welch*
INTRODUCTION
The Panic of 2008, as it is sometimes called,1 included the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers, the infamous bailout of AIG, and the fire sale of Bear Stearns, all of which
were punctuated with an overall economic slowdown and decline in the housing mar-
ket.2 Net worth in the United States fell by fourteen trillion dollars.3 Many blamed the
greed or negligence (or both) of corporate executives.4 Other causes were less tangible
but equally apparent. For instance, financial markets had become global and intercon-
nected, and financial products had become increasingly complex.5 These realizations,
and the attendant erosion of confidence, prompted outcries for regulatory reforms.6
In response, President Barack Obama signed the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act7 (Dodd-Frank) into law on July 21, 2010.8 Broadly speak-
ing, Dodd-Frank’s objectives were twofold: to regulate the shadow banking system,
thereby reducing the risks inherent in contemporary finance, and to mitigate the effects
caused by a failure of a large financial institution.9 Some market observers have noted
that Dodd-Frank represents the most significant piece of financial regulation since the
Great Depression.10
* J.D., William & Mary Law School, 2013.
1 See, e.g., Governor Kevin Warsh, Speech at the Federal Reserve Council of Institutional
Investors 2009 Spring Meeting: The Panic of 2008 (Apr. 6, 2009), available at http://www
.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/warsh20090406a.htm.
2 Roger B. Porter, Introduction: The Crisis of 2008 and Financial Services Regulation, in
NEW DIRECTIONS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION 1, 1 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2011).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 See, e.g., Warsh, supra note 1 (describing a loss of confidence and a push for reform).
7 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 22
U.S.C.). Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) and Sen. Christopher Dodd (D-CT) cosponsored the leg-
islation. See Christopher J. Dodd, Five Myths about Dodd-Frank, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2011,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-10-21/opinions/35278475_1_dodd-frank-community
-banks-financial-crisis.
8 Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Contentious Overhaul of the Financial System, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2010, at B3.
9 See DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL 4 (2011).
10 See Douglas J. Elliott, Dodd-Frank a Year Later: Has Financial Reform Made Us 
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Dodd-Frank gives regulatory bodies sweeping new authority and directs the im-
plementation of significant substantive reforms to the financial services industry.11 In
particular, Dodd-Frank’s Title II, the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) bestows
upon the Federal Depositors Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve (Board of Governors) and the Secretary of the Treasury enormous
power to place systemically important financial institutions in danger of collapse into
receivership.12 This power has enormous implications for the executives and creditors
of such institutions. With respect to the former, the OLA coerces corporate executives
to submit to receivership rather than defend their corporation’s interest in abbrevi-
ated, skewed, and secretive hearings.13 The OLA likewise affects creditors who may
be caught off guard when one of its corporate debtors is placed into receivership, par-
ticularly because it is not entirely clear when the FDIC will subject a corporation to
its power.14
To proponents of this sweeping new authority, the premise is simple: regulators
must have the authority to take over and liquidate financial institutions when those insti-
tutions are so important that a collapse would result in widespread financial calamity.15
In the aftermath of 2008, where it had become apparent that financial institutions were
so interconnected that the failure of one could mean the failure of all, this premise
seemed justifiable.16
But perhaps in implementation the OLA will exceed what is necessary and rea-
sonable. The OLA provides alarmingly truncated procedures and constrained judi-
cial review that raise legitimate due process concerns for the financial institution’s
Safer Yet?, BROOKINGS (July 19, 2011, 3:01 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front
/posts/2011/07/19-financial-reform-Elliott.
11 Id. (describing Dodd-Frank as “the most far-reaching reform of financial regulation . . .
since the Great Depression”).
12 See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 201 et seq. 124 Stat. 1442 (2006).
13 See Brent J. Horton, How Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority for Financial
Companies Violates Article III of the United States Constitution, 36 J. CORP. L. 869, 891
(2011) (noting the secrecy of OLA proceedings).
14 Id. at 891–92 (noting the secrecy and lack of transparency).
15 See Letter from Am. Bankers Ass’n, The Clearing House, Fin. Servs. Roundtable, and
Sec. Induct. & Fin. Mats. Assen to Robert E. Feldman, Exec. Sec’y of the Fed. Depositors
Ins. Corp. (May 23, 2011) [hereinafter Am. Bankers Ass’n], available at http://www.fdic
.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2011/11c11Ad73.PDF (stating that “a severe destabilization or
collapse of the U.S. financial system could impose severe and lasting damage on the broader
economy . . . by causing a severe contraction of the supply of money and credit over an ex-
tended period of time”).
16 See Enhanced Oversight After the Financial Crisis: The Wall Street Reform Act at One
Year: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 112th Cong.
12–14 (2011) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve) [hereinafter Enhanced
Oversight] (explaining that financial conditions should be met with “a macroprudential approach
to supervision and regulation” (emphasis omitted)).
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executives and its creditors.17 Moreover, the regulators can invoke the OLA and place
an institution in receivership in total secrecy; the public will not know of the action
until liquidation has commenced.18 In practice, the constitutionality of this power is
therefore in doubt.
Part I of this Note briefly recounts the events giving rise to Dodd-Frank and the
justification for intervening in financial institutions deemed too big to fail. Part II ex-
plains the salient provisions of the OLA. Part III examines the OLA in implementa-
tion and posits that, as written, Dodd-Frank raises serious questions of constitutionality
under the First and Fifth Amendments. Part IV argues that pre-existing bankruptcy law
can adequately deal with the problems the OLA was designed to address but without
the attendant constitutional problems. It is important to point out at the outset that
this Note purposely avoids delving into macroeconomic theory, and examines the
OLA’s theoretical effectiveness only when necessary to critique the legal grounds
on which it purportedly rests.
I. THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS, PRE-DODD-FRANK FINANCIAL
REGULATION, AND “TOO BIG TO FAIL”
To properly understand the enormity of the recent financial crisis that precip-
itated Dodd-Frank’s passage, a brief historical exposition of financial regulation
is necessary. The Banking Act of 1933,19 otherwise known as the Glass-Steagall
Act, created the FDIC and regulated banks’ ability to speculate by prohibiting com-
mercial banks from engaging in investment banking; for over six decades under
Glass-Steagall, commercial and investment banking existed separately.20 Banks
17 See Am. Bankers Ass’n, supra note 15 (noting that the OLA may insufficiently protect
the due process rights of secured and unsecured creditors against potential errors committed
by the FDIC in implementation); see also Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Dodd-
Frank for Bankruptcy Lawyers 19 AM. BANKER INST. L. REV. 287, 296–97 (2011) (noting
that the inability of courts to review the merits of an FDIC decision to place a company into
receivership raises serious due process concerns).
18 See Does the Dodd-Frank Act End “Too Big to Fail?”: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 85 (2011)
(statement of Professor Stephen J. Lubben, Seton Hall Univ. Sch. Of Law) (criticizing the
opacity of the OLA hearings and procedures and noting that lack of transparency will result
in public suspicion).
19 Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1923) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
20 See James R. Smoot, Striking Camp and Moving to Higher Ground: The Hazardous
Subtleties of “Subtle Hazards” in Bank Regulation, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 21, 24–26 (1995)
(noting that Glass-Steagall, enacted during a financial crisis, aimed to separate commercial
banking from investment banking). This legislation was necessary because “the promotional
incentives of investment banking and the investment banker’s pecuniary stake in the success
of particular investment opportunities (were) destructive of prudent and disinterested
commercial banking and of public confidence in the commercial banking system.” Inv. Co.
Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 634 (1971).
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that wished to lend to consumers could not engage in speculative transactions or
issue securities.21
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 199922 removed this separation requirement.23
Investment banks that previously issued securities could now engage in commercial
banking by accepting customer deposits.24 The result was that financial institutions
could now grow so large and become so interconnected that the failure of one firm
could cause the collapse of other firms that were counterparties to its transactions.25
In other words, financial institutions became “too big to fail.”26
Dodd-Frank clearly states its two principal objectives: to limit the risks associated
with contemporary finance, and to limit the damage caused by failures of large finan-
cial institutions.27 The first objective seeks to avoid risk altogether, while the second
objective seeks to mitigate the effects of a systemically important financial institution’s
failure.28 The OLA serves as a primary tool to implement this second objective.29 How-
ever well-intentioned, the OLA as written could be perceived as part of a problematic
theme throughout Dodd-Frank that allows for unpredictable and ad hoc regulatory
intervention, thereby muddling what should be a framework of transparent rules.30
Worse, it stretches the bounds of constitutionality by subjecting stakeholders in large
companies to a regulatory framework devoid of transparent rules and procedures that
govern conduct; on the contrary, the fate of corporations, executives, and creditors
depends entirely upon the whims of financial regulators.31
21 See Smoot, supra note 20, at 25–26.
22 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
23 See Matthew J. Restrepo, The Convergence of Commercial and Investment Banking
Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: Revisiting Old Risks and Facing New Problems, 11 L.
& BUS. REV. AM. 269, 272–73 (2005) (explaining that Gramm-Leach-Bliley allowed for the
merger of investment and commercial banking by eliminating the separateness requirement
of Glass-Steagall).
24 Id.
25 See id.; see also Paul L. Lee, The Dodd-Frank Act Orderly Liquidation Authority: A
Preliminary Analysis and Critique—Part I, 128 BANKING L.J. 771, 783 (2011) (noting that
the financial meltdown of 2008 prompted the Treasury Department to note that existing options
for dealing with interconnected non-bank financial entities were inadequate).
26 See Statement of Republican Policy: H.R. 4173, the “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act,” REPUBLICAN CLOAKROOM (June 30, 2010), http://repcloakroom
.house.gov/news/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=%20193034 [hereinafter Statement of
Republican Policy] (stating that the regulatory authority to designate institutions as systemically
important codifies the concept that some institutions cannot be allowed to fail).
27 See SKEEL, supra note 9, at 4.
28 Id.
29 See Lee, supra note 25, at 779 (explaining that OLA operates as an alternative to a bank-
ruptcy proceeding, but aims to liquidate failed institutions in a more orderly fashion).
30 See SKEEL, supra note 9, at 9. Skeel points out that “ad hoc intervention by regulators”
will “reach[ ] its zenith [when dealing with] financial institutions in distress.” Id. This is prob-
lematic because it disaggregates regulatory discretion from “basic rule-of-law constraints.” Id.
31 See Statement of Republican Policy, supra note 26 (criticizing regulator’s power).
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II. THE ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY
The OLA seeks to “target[ ] the perceived evils that presumably were root causes
of the financial crisis.”32 This gives regulators, namely the FDIC, Board of Governors,
and the Secretary of the Treasury, the power to designate entities that are systemically
important to the financial stability of the United States.33 This designation can include
companies that are not banks at all, provided they meet the statutory definition of a
covered entity.34 Remarkably, the statute does not provide a definitional guidepost for
regulators to determine when a company poses a systemic risk. As Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke admitted, rules promulgated to implement the OLA will
“ultimately remain subjective, and . . . the systemic criticality of any individual firm
depends on the environment.”35
By any standard, the powers granted to the FDIC and other executive branch
agencies are bold. For brevity’s sake, the salient provisions of the OLA, codified at
12 U.S.C. § 5382, are enumerated as follows:
Subsequent to a determination . . . that a financial company
satisfies the criteria [relating to systemic risk], the Secretary [of
the Treasury] shall notify the [FDIC] and the covered financial
company. If the board of directors . . . of the covered financial
company acquiesces or consents to the appointment of the [FDIC]
as receiver, the Secretary shall [so appoint]. If the . . . financial
company does not . . . consent . . . , the Secretary shall petition the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia for an
order authorizing [the appointment].36
On a strictly confidential basis, and without any prior public
disclosure, the Court, after notice to the covered financial com-
pany and a hearing in which the covered financial company may
oppose the petition, shall determine whether the determination
of the Secretary that the covered financial company is in default
32 Regulatory Developments 2010, 66 BUS. LAW. 665, 665 (2011).
33 Id.
34 See id. (stating that entities “provid[ing] payment systems, settlement and clearance, and
similar services, will be deemed financial market utilities that are systemically important”);
see also 12 U.S.C. § 5381(a)(11) (2006) (defining “financial company” as a company incor-
porated under the laws of any state that is “predominately engaged in activities that the Board
of Governors has determined are financial in nature”).
35 Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention
and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry
Comm’n, 111th Cong. 101 (2010) (testimony of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve).
36 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
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or in danger of default and satisfies the definition of a financial
company . . . is arbitrary and capricious.37
If the Court does not make a determination within 24 hours
of receipt of the petition . . . the petition shall be granted by op-
eration of law; . . . the Secretary shall appoint the [FDIC] as
receiver; and . . . liquidation under this subchapter shall automat-
ically and without further notice or action be commenced and
the [FDIC] may immediately take all actions authorized under
this subchapter.38
This authority seeks to entirely supplant Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization
for insolvent financial companies with a mandatory liquidation.39 Under this scheme,
liquidation is the only option, albeit with a different set of procedural rules than one
would find in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.40 These paradigmatic shifts have
drawn sharp criticism from some industry groups and commentators. First, some point
out that an additional regulatory scheme amounts to an overreaction that “may over-
compensate for the perceived failings of the prior regulatory regime.”41 Second, oppo-
nents argue that the OLA will actually create unintended consequences by reinforcing
the concept of systemic risk; by identifying nonbank financial companies as systemi-
cally important, subjecting these firms to “heightened prudential standards . . . [will]
signal[ ] to the market that these firms will be supported by the government.”42 Third,
opponents believe that the OLA will continue the practice of bailing out systemically
important firms; indeed, under OLA the FDIC has the authority to selectively pay
creditors and borrow from the Treasury in order to do so.43
As the OLA has yet to be tested in practice,44 the merits and criticisms of the
FDIC’s sweeping authority is debatable and generally beyond the scope of this paper.
However, the fact that the efficacy of the OLA is open to reasonable debate at all is
37 Id. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2006) (emphasis added). It is important to note that the statute
provides for no judicial review of the FDIC’s finding that the company at issue poses a sys-
temic risk. Id.
38 Id. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(v) (2006) (emphasis added).
39 See Lee, supra note 25, at 779 (noting that OLA under Title II allows only for liquidation).
40 Id. (explaining that although the OLA engrafts some provisions of the Bankruptcy Code,
it does require that liquidation, as opposed to reorganization, be the only allowable method
of resolution). Further, the OLA operates as a special administrative proceeding with limited
judicial oversight, and unlike bankruptcy, creditors have virtually no say in the process. Id.
41 Id. at 781.
42 Id. at 782.
43 Id.
44 Heath Tarbert et al., The Dodd-Frank Act: Two Years Later, METROPOLITAN CORP.
COUNS. (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/20915/dodd-frank-act
-two-years-later.
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quite relevant when considering the FDIC’s authority in the broader context. The
OLA’s secretive proceedings constrain the public’s (and, of course, the interested
parties’) ability to monitor governmental action.45 Because the OLA allows regu-
lators to identify institutions as systemically important, there exists an implicit as-
sumption that the public writ large is a stakeholder with an interest in the resolution
of the failing institution; thus, the public should have some access to the proceedings
at issue. Moreover, the abbreviated and expedited proceedings curtail due process
rights of corporations, the corporate executives, and the corporate creditors, and it is
not at all clear that the ends can justify the means.46 In addressing the “too-big-to-fail
conundrum,”47 Congress failed to account for legitimate First Amendment and due
process concerns.
III. THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY AS WRITTEN IS SUBJECT TO
NUMEROUS CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
The public writ large and corporate executives and creditors are, in many respects,
poles apart. But with respect to the OLA, they can find common ground. Both groups
should feel that the powers conferred on the FDIC constitute regulatory overreaching,
albeit for different reasons. The public should be concerned that OLA proceedings are
shrouded in secrecy; by being denied a right of public access, the public cannot ensure
the government truly acts in its best interests.48 On the other hand, corporate executives
should find the OLA procedures to represent a casual (or perhaps nefarious) disregard
of their right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard in order to protect their interests
and fulfill their duties to shareholders.49 These are legitimate First and Fifth Amendment
concerns, and each will be discussed in turn.
First, the OLA depends upon procedures conducted in secret in order to accom-
plish its goals.50 Because the FDIC makes a recommendation to place a company into
receivership,51 it logically follows that the FDIC must conduct some sort of internal
proceeding or formal evaluation as a condition precedent to that recommendation.
45 Scott Pruitt & Alan Wilson, Op-Ed., Dodd-Frank’s ‘Orderly Liquidation’ Is Out of
Order, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2012, at A17.
46 Id.
47 Regulatory Developments 2010, supra note 32, at 665.
48 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 592 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (observing that public access to court proceedings is an important part of our “checks
and balances” system because it “is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power”).
49 See Baird & Morrison, supra note 17, at 8 (noting that only the Secretary of the Treasury
considers shareholder interests).
50 See 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2006) (requiring the judicial proceedings to be
conducted in secret and imposing criminal and/or financial penalties on individuals who disclose
information relating to the pendency of an action); see also Horton, supra note 13, at 891 (noting
that secrecy required by the statute raises some suspicion about the efficacy of such procedures).
51 See Baird & Morrison, supra note 17, at 8.
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These proceedings are obviously closed to the public because the targeted company
cannot even be aware of the FDIC’s findings until the FDIC makes a recommendation
to the Treasury Secretary.52 Further, the statute provides on its face that judicial review
of FDIC’s petition for receivership must be conducted in secret;53 individuals who
disclose information relating to these proceedings are subject to hefty fines, criminal
prosecution, or both.54
The entire deliberative and judicial process may therefore be regarded as secret,
and the public cannot know that a company has been placed involuntarily into receiv-
ership until the FDIC begins liquidating its assets. The public—the relevant stake-
holders especially—cannot challenge the FDIC action at all; once liquidation begins,
the court will have already validated the FDIC action, and the interested public cannot
discover the action and its consequences until it is too late.55 This sharply contrasts
with the traditional bankruptcy process, where the public has historically been granted
some type of access to similar proceedings.56 In addition, a right to access—even if
limited—would serve the public interest and would advance Dodd-Frank’s stated ob-
jectives by ensuring accountability at the corporate and governmental levels and by
providing transparency into the fundamental policy and regulatory choices made to
manage the country’s economy.57
Second, the OLA’s expedited and truncated procedures seriously curtail the due
process rights of corporate executives and, perhaps, corporate creditors. To be sure, the
corporation and its executives have at stake a protected property interest. The directors
have no meaningful opportunity to challenge the FDIC’s finding that their company
poses a risk to the financial stability of the United States until the FDIC files its peti-
tion with the court, and because the proceedings are secret, neither will creditors.58 But
once this filing occurs, the judge has only twenty-four hours to review the FDIC’s
52 See generally 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A) (stating that the Secretary of the Treasury shall
notify the affected financial company once a determination has been made that the company
poses a systemic risk and the district court has been petitioned to appoint FDIC as receiver).
53 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii).
54 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(C).
55 See Pruitt & Wilson, supra note 45.
56 See Beth Bates Holliday, Construction and Application of 11 U.S.C.A. § 107(b)(2),
Which Requires Bankruptcy Court to Protect Person with Respect to “Scandalous” or
“Defamatory” Information Contained in Paper Filed with Court, 31 A.L.R. FED. 2D 439,
439 (2008) (stating that “the right of public access to judicial records is codified in 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 107, which establishes a broad right of public access to all papers filed in a bankruptcy case
subject only to limited exceptions”).
57 See Enhanced Oversight, supra note 16. Chairman Bernanke acknowledged that Dodd-
Frank constitutes “sweeping” reform which enables regulators to address the “too-big-to-fail
problem” through the use of new and expansive powers. Id. at 12–13. He also stated that the
private sector must work to adapt to Dodd-Frank by “learn[ing] lessons along the way.” Id.
at 14. It is hard to see how lessons can be learned when the entire process of determining that
a company poses a systemic risk is conducted in secret.
58 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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determination,59 and he must consider that finding under the very deferential “arbitrary
and capricious”60 standard germane to administrative law.61
Moreover, these procedures are unduly coercive and provide directors and officers
with only illusory protections. For if the directors or officers do not consent to receiver-
ship, they may be found personally liable under an ordinary negligence standard if the
court upholds the FDIC’s finding,62 which it presumably will, given the heavily defer-
ential standard of review in the FDIC’s favor. Under this specter of personal liability,
no rational director would contest the FDIC’s determination, even if doing so would
be in the best interest of the corporation, its shareholders, or its creditors.
A. Right to Access Under Richmond Newspapers and Its Progeny
The First Amendment guarantees a right of access to government proceedings in
at least some circumstances. The Supreme Court has found this guarantee to be explic-
itly granted in the text of the First Amendment itself and implicitly granted within
its penumbra.63 In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,64 the Supreme Court con-
sidered whether reporters had a First Amendment right of access to a criminal trial.65
The defendant, on trial for murder, had requested that his trial be closed to the public
because the previous three trials failed to produce a verdict.66 The trial judge agreed
and closed the trial to the public pursuant to a state statute conferring such authority.67
59 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(v) (2006).
60 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii).
61 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (stating that judicial review of decisions made by ad-
ministrative agencies are to be upheld unless “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with the law”); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (stating that arbitrary and capricious review is to be employed
narrowly, and requires courts to refrain from substituting their judgment for those of the agen-
cies they review); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (describing this standard
of review as being so highly deferential that it carries a presumption of valid agency action).
62 See 12 C.F.R. § 380.7 (2012) (stating that senior executives may be personally liable
for the “failed condition of a covered financial company . . . if he or she . . . [f]ailed to con-
duct his or her responsibilities with the degree of skill and care an ordinarily prudent person
in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances”). It is interesting to note that this
ordinary standard of negligence will supplant standards of gross negligence required to impose
personal liability on executives in some state jurisdictions. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 750 (Del. Ch. 2005) (explaining that directors breach their duty
of care only by acting with gross negligence, which requires a finding of “reckless indifference
to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders” (citations omitted)).
63 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 603–04 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
64 Id. at 555 (majority opinion).
65 Id. at 558.
66 Id. at 559–60.
67 Id. at 560.
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Several reporters sued and disputed Virginia’s argument that a Sixth Amend-
ment right to a public trial necessarily conferred a concomitant right to a private
trial.68 The Supreme Court agreed.69 It noted that a public right to attend criminal
trials had existed since the Norman Conquest and extended to the present day.70 The
long-established practice of allowing (and in some cases requiring) public access to
trials advanced societal goals of justice and fairness.71
The Court relied on numerous historical authorities, which noted that Colonial
America regarded public access to be a cornerstone of freedom and open government.72
For instance, West New Jersey colonial law provided that “in all publick courts of jus-
tice for tryals . . . civil or criminal, any persons . . . may freely come into, and attend the
said courts [so] that justice may not be done in a corner nor in any covert manner.”73
Pennsylvania adopted something similar.74 And the Continental Congress boasted to
its neighbors in Quebec of the desirability and the advantages of public access to trials:
[One] great right is that of trial by jury. This provides, that neither
life, liberty nor property, can be taken from the possessor, until
twelve of his unexceptionable countrymen and peers of his vici-
nage, who from that neighbourhood may reasonably be supposed
to be acquainted with his character, and the characters of the wit-
nesses, upon a fair trial, and full enquiry, face to face, in open
Court, before as many of the people as chuse to attend, shall
pass their sentence . . . .75
Although history and tradition provided for public access, the Court in Richmond
Newspapers emphasized that pragmatic concerns and democratic ideals underpinned
this tradition.76 Openness insured that trials functioned properly by “discourag[ing]
perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partial-
ity.”77 Jeremy Bentham, whom the Court championed as a proponent of open justice,
similarly observed that:
Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison
of publicity, all other checks are of small account. Recordation,
68 Id.
69 Id. at 580–81.
70 Id. at 564–65.
71 Id. at 564–67.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 567 (quoting SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 188 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1959)).
74 Id. at 568 (citing SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 73, at 217, and noting that
Pennsylvania’s constitution affirmed the principle of open courts).
75 Id. at 568–69 (quoting 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at
107 (1904)).
76 Id. at 568–69.
77 Id. at 569 (citing M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 343–45
(6th ed. 1820) (discussing the views of Blackstone and Hale)).
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appeal, whatever other institutions might present themselves in
the character of checks, would be found to operate rather as cloaks
than checks; as cloaks in reality, as checks only in appearance.78
Thus, the Court noted that public access to criminal trials had withstood the test
of time and had become a deeply rooted part of tradition because public participation
played such an effective role in the administration of government.79 And more than
promoting effective government, public observation inspired confidence in govern-
mental competence.80
After its exposition of history and tradition, the Court remarked that a “presump-
tion of openness inheres . . . under our system of justice.”81 The First Amendment, in
prohibiting the abridgement of speech and the press, and in vesting a right to peaceably
assemble, guarantees some right of public access to trials in order to prevent “govern-
ment from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may
draw.”82 The First Amendment goes beyond guaranteeing a right of individual ex-
pression, the Court explained, by safeguarding “the right to receive information.”83
In this way, the First Amendment “prohibit[s] government from summarily closing
courtroom doors which had long been open to the public.”84
Thus, the Court held, courtrooms are public places where the public generally
has a right to access, because the public’s presence historically has “enhance[d] the
integrity and quality of what takes place.”85 In summarizing its holding, the Court
stated that the First Amendment implicitly guarantees the right to attend trials; in the
absence of such a guarantee the freedoms of speech and of the press would be unnec-
essarily curtailed.86
The Court in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court87 formally announced that
an experience and logic test applied in First Amendment challenges to gain a right of
access to governmental proceedings.88 In this case, the Court held that the public had
a constitutional right of access to transcripts from a preliminary hearing given to a
defendant accused of murder.89 In cases dealing with First Amendment claims to a
78 Id. at 569 (quoting 1 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827)).
79 See id. at 569.
80 See id. at 572 (“[P]eople in an open society do not demand infallibility from their
institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing.”).
81 Id. at 573.
82 Id. at 576 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
83 Id. at 576 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 578.
86 Id. at 580–81.
87 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
88 Id. at 9.
89 Id. at 5–6.
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right of access, the Court stated that courts should consider first, “whether the place
and process have historically been open to the press and general public,”90 and sec-
ond, “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the
particular process in question.”91
A qualified First Amendment right of public access attaches if a court answers both
inquiries in the affirmative, which can be overcome only by a showing that closure
is necessary to preserve some important interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.92 A showing of reasonable alternatives may be sufficient to defeat a conten-
tion that the closure is narrowly tailored.93
Although the Richmond Newspaper and Press-Enterprise Courts confined their
holdings to the criminal trial context, later challenges predictably arose in the context
of administrative proceedings. In Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Ashcroft,94 newspaper
publishers challenged an administrative directive that prohibited public access to depor-
tation removal hearings.95 The Sixth Circuit held that Richmond Newspapers applied
to the proceedings in question.96 Noting that courts lack the power to second-guess
governmental choices, the Court acknowledged that the public represents the sole
“safeguard on th[e] extraordinary governmental power” that the executive and legis-
lative branches have to delineate individual liberties.97
In the deportation context, the Court heralded this right as indispensable because
the executive branch had the authority to unilaterally declare an alien as a “special
interest” case, thereby closing the proceedings to the public.98 Although the govern-
ment may have articulated plausible reasons for doing so, particularly in the aftermath
of the September 11th terrorist attacks, the Court recognized that this power could
lead to governmental abuse.99 The Court explained:
Democracies die behind closed doors. The First Amendment,
through a free press, protects the people’s right to know that their
government acts fairly, lawfully, and accurately in deportation
proceedings. When government begins closing doors, it selec-
tively controls information rightfully belonging to the people.
Selective information is misinformation. The Framers of the First
90 Id. at 8.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 9.
93 See id. at 14 (holding that failure to consider whether alternatives of total closure of the
preliminary hearing would have adequately preserved a defendant’s right to a fair trial rendered
the narrow tailoring requirement insufficient).
94 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
95 Id. at 683.
96 Id. at 694–700.
97 Id. at 683.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 682–83.
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Amendment “did not trust any government to separate the true
from the false for us.”100
This right of public access made sense, the Court explained, because the Consti-
tution prohibits administrative agencies from making unreviewable determinations
that implicate individual rights and liberties.101 The Court especially viewed with deri-
sion the government’s assertion that immigration judges (who are Article I judges)
could make a unilateral determination that a particular alien was a “special interest”
case in order to deny public access for security reasons.102 Indeed, it noted that suppress-
ing information simply by citing security concerns threatened to do violence to the very
purpose of the First Amendment because “[t]he guarding of . . . secrets at the expense
of informed representative government provides no real security for our Republic.”103
The Sixth Circuit noted, as a threshold matter, that Richmond Newspapers had not
been confined to the criminal trial context since first decided.104 Moreover, it prefaced
its analysis on the fact that the modern administrative state, although unknown to the
Founders at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, did not provide the government
with a mechanism to circumvent the application of the First Amendment in certain
proceedings.105 It flatly rejected any assertion to the contrary by stating:
[No] line has been drawn between judicial and administrative pro-
ceedings, with the First Amendment guaranteeing access to the
former but not the latter. “[T]he First Amendment question cannot
be resolved solely on the label we give the event, i.e., ‘trial’ or
otherwise.” . . . [T]here is a limited First Amendment right of ac-
cess to certain aspects of the executive and legislative branches.106
The Court observed that the newspaper plaintiffs should have access to quasi-
judicial proceedings, such as the deportation hearings at issue, but it emphasized that
any distinction between “trials and other official proceedings is not necessarily dis-
positive.”107 Because the individual had an ultimate stake in the hearing that resembled
100 Id. at 683 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 773 (1972)).
101 Id. at 692.
102 Id. at 692–93.
103 Id. at 693 (quoting New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971)
(Black, J., concurring)).
104 Id. at 695.
105 Id. (citing United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 824 (6th Cir. 2002) (regarding
a student disciplinary board hearing); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Fed. Trade
Comm’n, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177–79 (6th Cir. 1983) (regarding a civil action against admin-
istrative agency); Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists v. Sec’y of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 574 (D.
Utah 1985) (regarding an administrative proceeding)).
106 Id. (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986)).
107 Id. at 696 (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 516 (1984)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
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what could be expected at trial, a First Amendment right of access should prevent the
“legislature [from] artfully craft[ing] information out of the public eye.”108 The dis-
positive force invoked by applying Richmond Newspapers was therefore not the char-
acterization of the proceeding itself, but rather a party’s potential for hardship under
an adverse ruling.
In its application of the “experience” prong, the Court considered whether depor-
tation hearings had traditionally been open to the public.109 Again, it noted that a short
tradition of access could result in the satisfaction of the Richmond Newspapers test,
especially because access to a particular government proceeding may be a fundamental
part of the proceeding itself.110 Deportation hearings, the Court found, had generally
enjoyed a policy of openness.111 And because this history of openness presumably in-
forms legislation, open hearings therefore advance fairness to the parties involved.112
This “favorable judgment of experience”113 provided proof that formal administra-
tive hearings should be open, a presumption recognized by the Supreme Court at the
inception of the modern administrative state:
The vast expansion of this field of administrative regulation in
response to the pressure of social needs is made possible under
our system by adherence to the basic principles that the legislature
shall appropriately determine the standards of administrative action
and that in administrative proceedings of a quasi-judicial character
the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play. These demand a “fair and
open hearing.”114
Public access likewise satisfied the “logic” prong, because such access played a
“significant positive role” in the deportation process.115 In this part of its analysis, the
Court announced five factors that informed its result. “First, public access acts as a
108 Id.
109 Id. at 700.
110 See id. at 701 (stating that “a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment
of experience . . . . what is crucial in individual cases is whether access to particular government
process is important in terms of that very process” (quoting Richmond Newspapers Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. at 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted))). This
underscores the notion that the First Amendment contains “broad principles” and must apply
in the administrative context, which was unknown to the Framers at the time the Bill of Rights
was adopted. Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 702.
113 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589.
114 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 703 (quoting Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 14–15
(1938)) (emphasis omitted).
115 Id. at 703 (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1986)).
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check on the actions of the Executive by assuring us that proceedings are conducted
fairly and properly.”116 This is particularly true where the executive enjoys vast author-
ity, and in this regard the power of public scrutiny safeguards essential liberties.117
“Second, openness ensures that government does its job properly; that it does not
make mistakes.”118 In the immigration context, the consequences of a mistake made
because of inadequate process should be painfully obvious.119 In other contexts, how-
ever, a relevant inquiry would focus on consequences to private parties in interest, or
the public writ large, that could flow from a governmental mistake.
Third, openness to governmental proceedings has a “cathartic effect”120 by pro-
viding an outlet for “community concern, hostility, and emotion[ ].”121 This cathartic
effect was purportedly served in Detroit Free Press by allowing the public to scruti-
nize deportation of aliens in the painful wake of September 11th; especially in trying
times, the public must be reassured that the government can decisively act in a manner
that fosters respect and protection for individual rights and liberties.122
“Fourth, openness enhances the perception of integrity and fairness.”123 Govern-
ment proceedings, the Court surmised, cannot command public confidence unless the
public can know for itself that such proceedings are legitimate.124 In short, secrecy
breeds suspicion and distrust.
Fifth, a right of access “ensure[s] that the individual citizen can effectively
participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-government.”125 The
First Amendment seeks to promote and protect discussion of government action;126
consequently, the public must be informed if it is to challenge or affirm a particu-
lar governmental process.127 But when the government can suppress information,
whether in deportation hearings or in other contexts, its procedures can become “a
powerful tool for deception” that undermines the very function that lies at the heart
of good governance.128
The Detroit Free Press court concluded by holding that the closed deportation
hearings failed the narrow tailoring requirement.129 Although the government had
116 Id. at 703–04.
117 See id. at 704.
118 Id.
119 See id.
120 Id.
121 Id. (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980)).
122 See id. (noting the heightened importance of government’s adherence to the preservation
of individual rights during trying times).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. (quoting Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 705.
128 Id.
129 Id.
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shown that closure served a compelling interest—in this case, preventing terror groups
from analyzing which of its members had been intercepted, and how—the court warned
that a simple invocation of “national security” could not justify a “wholesale suspen-
sion of First Amendment rights.”130
Similarly, in North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft,131 the Third Circuit held
that a newspaper did not have a right of access to deportation hearings.132 Although
there had been a history of open deportation hearings, the court did not find that public
access played some positive (i.e., logical) role in the process.133 Thus, although Detroit
Free Press and North Jersey Media were ultimately decided differently, one important
congruity can be logically deduced from these opinions—the Richmond Newspapers
“experience and logic test” applies to administrative hearings.
1. Richmond Newspapers and its Progeny Apply to Orderly Liquidation
Authority Proceedings
Because OLA proceedings necessarily entail an adjudication of private rights and
public interests,134 a presumption exists that these proceedings should be open to the
public under the First Amendment.135 The “First Amendment guarantees of speech
and press . . . prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which
had long been open to the public at the time that Amendment was adopted.”136 This
rule forbids the government from arbitrarily interfering with the public’s access to
important information in contravention of First Amendment guarantees of freedom
of speech and press.137
Again, administrative and civil proceedings do not enjoy automatic immunity
from the teachings of Richmond Newspapers simply because they do not carry crim-
inal consequences.138 Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly decided the issue,
the circuit courts are strongly in accord that the two-part experience and logic test under
Richmond Newspapers applies to determine whether the First Amendment guarantees
public access to civil proceedings.139
130 Id. at 709–10.
131 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
132 Id. at 221.
133 Id. at 201.
134 See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text (discussing interests at stake).
135 See Baird & Morrison, supra note 17, at 13.
136 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980).
137 See id. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting generally the importance of guaranteeing
public access as a safeguard against a governmental policy of concealment).
138 See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text.
139 See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 685 n.11 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing
Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988); Westmoreland v.
CBS, 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.
1984); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3d Cir. 1984); Newman v.
Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1983)).
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Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the government has additional lati-
tude in determining when to shield noncriminal proceedings from the public, OLA
provisions are punitive in nature.140 This punitive aspect should militate in favor of
openness, particularly because the directors can be subject to personal liability by con-
testing the FDIC’s decision to place the corporation into receivership.141
2. The “Experience” Prong Weighs in Favor of Public Access to FDIC
Determinations of Systemic Risk and the Concomitant Judicial Review
Required to Implement Receivership
OLA proceedings should be open to the public because similar proceedings have
long been matters of public concern.142 In determining whether the first prong of
Richmond Newspapers is satisfied, courts should “consider[ ] whether the place and
process have historically been open to the press and general public.”143
Generally, the public enjoys observation rights with respect to most proceedings
that occur within the federal court system.144 Proceedings designed to deal with in-
solvency are no different; accordingly, a presumption in favor of openness attaches in
bankruptcy cases.145 In limited circumstances, a bankruptcy court may deny public ac-
cess in order to protect trade secrets or to prevent disclosure of defamatory material.146
With respect to the public access doctrine, this represents a radical point of demar-
cation between bankruptcy practice and the OLA. Historically, bankruptcy courts
have shielded information containing trade secrets or defamatory material from public
scrutiny.147 These considerations justify closure because they have little to do with
the underlying proceeding, they can be used for improper purposes, and they are
specifically enumerated (and therefore appropriately limited) by statute.148
140 See 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(C) (2006).
141 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
142 See William T. Bodoh & Michelle M. Morgan, Protective Orders in the Bankruptcy
Court: The Congressional Mandate of Bankruptcy Code Section 107 and Its Constitutional
Implications, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 67, 68 (1996) (stating that the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
§ 107(a) “creat[es] a presumption in favor of public access to all papers filed in a bankruptcy
case as well as to bankruptcy court dockets”).
143 Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
144 See Federal Courts & the Public, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts
/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/FederalCourtsAndThePublic.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2013)
(“With certain very limited exceptions, each step of the judicial process is open to the public. . . .
[F]ederal courthouses are . . . designed to inspire in the public a respect for the tradition and
purpose of the American judicial process . . . . [This] right of public access . . . is partly derived
from the Constitution . . . . By conducting their judicial work in public view, judges enhance
public confidence in the courts.”).
145 See 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (2006) (providing that bankruptcy filings and bankruptcy court
dockets “are public records and open to examination”).
146 Id. § 107(b).
147 Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 142, at 91–92.
148 See § 107(b); Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 142, at 92.
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On the contrary, the OLA carries with it no presumption of openness, and it fails
to even acknowledge the public’s interest in open judicial proceedings. Perhaps Con-
gress could have included carefully crafted exceptions to a presumption of closure, but
as drafted, the OLA proceedings are absolutely secret.149 As previously stated, avoid-
ing a proprietary injury to a party has justified limiting public access to bankruptcy
proceedings.150 But closing the OLA proceedings to the public protects no party to the
proceedings; if the FDIC has invoked its authority, its targeted corporation should al-
ready be in financial distress and therefore would have no reason to fear additional
injury.151 Therefore, because insolvency proceedings have historically been open to
the public and because Congress departed from similar practice by failing to specifi-
cally enumerate grounds for closure, courts should find the first prong of Richmond
Newspapers satisfied in challenges to the OLA on public access grounds.
3. The “Logic” Prong Weighs in Favor of Limited Public Access to FDIC
Determinations of Systemic Risk and the Concomitant Judicial Review
Required to Implement Receivership
OLA proceedings should be open to the public because, as a stakeholder in the
resolution of systemically important financial institutions, it must be informed on
matters on which government action substantially affects its interests. In determin-
ing whether the second prong of Richmond Newspapers is satisfied, courts should
consider “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of
the particular process in question.”152 Even when openness would frustrate certain gov-
ernmental operations, the proponent of closure must demonstrate that some overriding
interest would be prejudiced if the proceeding were not closed.153
The five-factor logic test154 articulated by Detroit Free Press strongly militates in
favor of public access to OLA proceedings. First, opening at least part of the OLA pro-
cess (at the very least, the judicial hearing) would enhance the appearance of fairness.
After all, secrecy breeds suspicion, and considering what is at stake in each OLA pro-
ceeding, the FDIC (and other relevant agencies) would ultimately benefit from this
openness in the long run.
Secondly, the FDIC may take extra precaution to ensure that invoking the OLA
represents the last and most sound option if that decision could be later dissected by
149 See 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2006).
150 In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 191 B.R. 675, 679 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) (acknowledging the
First Amendment right to access but denying intervenor access to bankruptcy court papers
because they contained defamatory and scandalous material).
151 See 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b) (2006) (stating the requirements for the Secretary of Treasury
to invoke authority over a financial company).
152 Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
153 See generally id. (noting that a party whose interest is potentially affected by govern-
mental action has the right to object to closure unless the government can articulate some
justification otherwise).
154 See supra notes 116–28 and accompanying text.
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the public. Without that safeguard, no real guarantee could exist that OLA consti-
tuted the best option, or that other alternatives—such as reorganization—were seri-
ously considered. Liquidation will have irreversible consequences in all cases,155 so
oversight conducted ex post will do nothing to remedy a governmental mistake, even
though it may prevent future ones.156 This avoids the governmental tendency to con-
duct secret proceedings in order to “avoid criticism [by] . . . proceed[ing] informally
and less carefully.”157
Third, openness would provide the “cathartic effect”158 with respect to a matter of
great public concern. The 2008 financial crisis left the public reeling, and hostile emo-
tions will probably not abate anytime soon.159 The public might therefore appreciate the
sense of justice that open OLA proceedings could provide; that sense of justice would
be reinforced—and the cathartic effect enhanced—if the public could know that the
proceedings were conducted with a full panoply of rights accorded to the corporate
stakeholders resisting enforcement.
Fourth, and perhaps most persuasively, openness would lend integrity and fair-
ness to the proceedings. After all, much of the rationale for Dodd-Frank rests on the
premise that the public has lost confidence on what appears to be an insufficiently
regulated market economy.160 But by closing OLA proceedings to the public, Congress
has undermined its own stated objectives of transparency. Moreover, simply enhancing
the OLA’s procedural safeguards (as discussed more fully below) would be insuffi-
cient in and of itself; procedures, no matter how fair, are meaningless if the proceed-
ings themselves are shielded from public scrutiny.161
Fifth, and finally, openness allows the public to actively participate in a republican
system of government.162 As Detroit Free Press points out, citizens must be privy to
government action if they are to affirm or contest them.163 If companies are systemically
155 See § 5382(a)(1)(B) (stating the effect of determinations).
156 See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 704 (6th Cir. 2002); see also 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(d)(2)(B) (2006) (providing a thirty day window for federally chartered thrift institutions
to seek judicial review of a receivership determination and providing for a stay of receivership
during the pendency of the appeal). The OLA provides for no stay pending appeal; if an institu-
tion appeals the district court’s order of receivership, liquidation continues without interruption.
12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(B).
157 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 704.
158 Id.
159 See SKEEL, supra note 9, at 21–22.
160 See H.R. 4173 pmbl., 111th Cong. (2010) (stating its purpose “[t]o promote the financial
stability of the United States by improving . . . transparency in the financial system”).
161 See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 704 (stating that even strict procedural safeguards
“would be of limited worth if the public is not persuaded that the standards are being fairly
enforced. Legitimacy rests in large part on public understanding” (quoting First Amendment
Coal. v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d, 467, 486 (3d Cir. 1986) (Adams, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part))).
162 Id. at 704.
163 Id. at 705.
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important enough to be liquidated by the FDIC, then surely the public should be privy
to the procedures employed and the basis claimed for the governmental action. To be
sure, any action (or inaction) would impact the economy writ large and thus the lives
of every citizen, at least tangentially. The public therefore has a resounding right to
know how and why the FDIC chooses to invoke the OLA; without that knowledge, the
public cannot hold its elected representatives accountable for the successes or failures
of republican government.
4. No Compelling State Interest Exists for Denying Public Access to Orderly
Liquidation Proceedings
To be sure, proponents of OLA will argue that administrative and judicial pro-
ceedings should be secret in the systemic risk context in order to prevent irrational or
erratic market reaction.164 Indeed, this is probably the only “compelling justification”
that could arguably permit regulators to curtail a right of access and on which to base
criminal penalties for disclosure.165 Opponents have more than a quibble with this
argument, because it is flatly wrong.
To illustrate, consider the market reactions surrounding Lehman’s bankruptcy and
AIG’s rescue. Both scenarios were similar in that important financial entities were dis-
tressed, but were different in that the procedures employed to deal with that distress
diverged.166 In the former, the government took no action, and Lehman dissolved into
bankruptcy;167 in the latter, the government spared AIG the same fate by providing it
with an astounding 127.4 billion dollars.168 The market reacted similarly in each, de-
spite the fact that one firm failed and one survived.169 Thus, secret proceedings will do
little, if anything, to curtail market reaction to the subsequent resolution procedures
when a financial institution suffers from financial distress.
B. Notice, Hearing, and the Limits of Procedural Due Process with Respect to
Deprivation of Property
The expansive government powers inherent in the FDIC’s orderly liquidation
authority seriously curtail Fifth Amendment due process rights of corporations, their
executives, and their creditors. Viewed in the aggregate, the truncated procedures
164 See Baird & Morrison, supra note 17, at 14–15.
165 See 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(c) (2006).
166 SKEEL, supra note 9, at 24.
167 See Peter J. Wallison, The Fed vs. the FDIC on Lehman’s Failure, AMERICAN (Apr. 27,
2011), http://www.american.com/archive/2011/april/the-fed-vs-the-fdic-on-lehmans-failure
(explaining that questions continue to circulate as to why the Federal Reserve allowed Lehman
to fail but infused capital into insolvent firms before and after that failure).
168 Bailout Tracker, CNNMONEY.COM, http://money.cnn.com/news/storysupplement
/economy/bailouttracker/#AIG (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
169 See SKEEL, supra note 9, at 23 (using the volatility index to compare market reactions
to Lehman’s bankruptcy filing and AIG’s bailout).
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are crafted to produce a result where a court simply affirms an administrative deter-
mination. As the law is currently written, corporate executives and corporate cred-
itors lack a meaningful opportunity to contest the FDIC’s findings and its petition
for receivership.
First, the FDIC, Board of Governors, and Secretary of the Treasury must make a
collective determination that an institution presents a risk to the “financial stability”170
of the United States. The Secretary of the Treasury may then direct the FDIC to sub-
ject that institution to receivership.171 Presumably, the FDIC may rely upon public in-
formation relating to the corporation and any other private information that may be
available to it by virtue of its regulatory functions.172 This determination of systemic
importance, however, must necessarily be grounded in a subjective assessment of
facts.173 The FDIC makes its determination in private, without the corporation and its
executives having an opportunity to contest its determination.174 As will be explained,
the statute essentially provides for summary judicial ratification of the FDIC’s decision
to place a company into receivership.175
Second, the FDIC only informs the corporation of its determination immediately
before filing a petition for receivership in the district court.176 Once informed of the
FDIC’s determination, the corporation may consent to receivership or contest the
FDIC’s determination in the district court.177 However, the district court only has
twenty-four hours in which to review the FDIC’s determination, and if the court fails
to rule within that time frame, the corporation is placed into receivership by operation
of law.178 Directors and officers of non-consenting corporations may be personally
liable under a theory of ordinary negligence for the failure of their company, and neg-
ligence is presumed if a corporation is placed in receivership.179
The entire process gives the corporation only an illusory right to a meaningful
hearing. Because the FDIC’s determination is subject only to very deferential “arbitrary
and capricious” review,180 the directors and officers should presume that the FDIC’s
170 See 12 U.S.C. § 5383(a)(2)(A)–(B) (2006) (stating that the FDIC may present the
Secretary of the Treasury its determination that a company is “in default or in danger of
default” and a “description of the effect that the default of the financial company would have
on financial stability in the United States”).
171 Id. § 5383(b).
172 Id. (stating the Secretary of the Treasury shall take any action, “[n]otwithstanding any
other provision of Federal or State law,” in order to make a determination).
173 For instance, accurate valuations and solvency opinions of companies large enough to
be subject to the OLA would be open to debate.
174 See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
175 See discussion infra notes 180–87 and accompanying text.
176 § 5382(a)(1)(A)–(B).
177 Id. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(i).
178 Id. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(v).
179 12 C.F.R. § 380.7 (2012).
180 See § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii) (requiring court to uphold a determination of systemic risk unless
the FDIC’s determination that the company was in “default or in danger of default” and that
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unilateral decision will be upheld.181 Moreover, because they may suffer personal
liability as a result,182 there is little reason to think they would refuse to consent to
receivership even if the FDIC’s finding of systemic risk was erroneous.
The procedures employed can potentially affect the interested corporate creditors;
accordingly, the FDIC cannot disregard the creditor’s right to due process when in-
voking the OLA.183 To be sure, if the FDIC places the institution into receivership, it
will ultimately determine which creditors get paid.184 The creditors should therefore
be entitled to either notice or the opportunity to participate in the judicial review of the
FDIC’s determination because their property interests will be affected by the liquida-
tion of their corporate debtor.185
As written, these procedures are coercive and are crafted to produce a foreordained
result.186 Given that the FDIC has the nearly unreviewable power to seize virtually any
corporation it deems susceptible to its statutory powers, and considering that the FDIC
can subsequently liquidate the corporation’s property, the due process available under
the circumstances is wholly inadequate.187
the company satisfies the definitional requirement of a “covered financial company” was
arbitrary and capricious).
181 § 5382(a)(1)(B).
182 Hollace T. Cohen, Orderly Liquidation Authority: A New Insolvency Regime to Address
Systematic Risk, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1143, 1222 (2011) (“It appears that a judgment was made
by Congress that senior executives and directors should be held responsible for the financial
condition of the covered financial company . . . .”).
183 See Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 190–91 (1902) (holding the Fifth
Amendment requires notice in bankruptcy); see also Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304
U.S. 502, 518 (1938) (“[I]f Congress is acting within its bankruptcy power, it may authorize
the . . . court to affect . . . property rights, provided the limitations of the due process clause
are observed.”).
184 See 12 U.S.C. § 5390(b)(4) (2006) (outlining the FDIC’s powers in receivership, in-
cluding the discretion to determine whether a creditor has a valid claim and the authority to
treat similarly situated creditors inequitably).
185 See Canada S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 539 (1883) (holding that secured cred-
itors have substantive due process rights in bankruptcy proceedings). This holding continues
to influence due process jurisprudence despite the fact that West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937), overturned Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and its view of
economic substantive due process. See KENNETH N. KLEE, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME
COURT 142–43 (2008) (noting the current influence and validity of Gebhard’s holding despite
limitations on economic substantive due process).
186 See 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iv) (2006) (stating that the reviewing court should con-
sider the FDIC’s petition for receivership under an “arbitrary and capricious” standard). This
is a very deferential standard that will nearly always result in resolution in favor of the FDIC.
See supra notes 61, 180–81 and accompanying text.
187 The severity of the deprivation should require something stricter than “arbitrary and
capricious” review. See Craig Boyd Garner, Unconstitutional Regulatory Seizures Under the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991: The Final Blow to the
Business of National Banks, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 131, 135 (1994) (arguing that the FDIC
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1. Pre- and Post-Deprivation Rights to a Hearing
The application of due process “is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place, and circumstances.”188 Rather, “due process is flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”189 In deter-
mining the constitutional adequacy of due process, particularly in the administrative
law context, courts must consider three factors. First, courts should consider “the private
interest that will be affected by the official action.”190 Second, courts should consider
“the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,”
including the value of “additional or substitute procedural safeguards.”191 Third, courts
should consider the government’s fiscal and administrative interests that “additional
or substitute procedural requirement[s]” would impose.192
In Goldberg v. Kelly,193 the Supreme Court considered whether a state agency’s
termination of welfare benefits violated due process when the affected individual could
not contest the agency’s decision to terminate until benefits were actually terminated.194
The applicable state regulation provided that the Commissioner of Social Services must
notify a welfare recipient of the decision to terminate benefits seven days before the
termination occurred.195 Although the recipient could request that determination be
reviewed and reconsidered, the recipient had no right to an evidentiary hearing until
benefits were actually terminated.196 In essence, the Court held that under the circum-
stances, summary and truncated administrative proceedings that deprived an often
destitute recipient of his benefit lacked constitutional adequacy.197
The Court first noted that welfare benefits constituted a protected property interest
that could not be taken from a private individual without due process.198 Because these
entitlements were granted and guaranteed by a state statute, the Court dismissed any
contention that they could be considered anything less than a protected right.199
“remains virtually outside the realm of judicial scrutiny”). But even assuming the adequacy
of that review, corporate executives cannot be expected to rebut the FDIC’s determination in
a hearing that takes place inside of twenty-four hours. See Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr. Inc., 485
U.S. 80, 86–87 (1988) (holding that defendants lacking meritorious defenses are nonetheless
entitled to adequate due process).
188 Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
189 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
190 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
194 Id. at 255.
195 Id. at 258.
196 Id. at 259.
197 Id. at 268–69.
198 Id. at 262.
199 Id.
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The Court then found the risk of erroneous deprivation of benefits to be too great
to sustain the state agency’s procedures.200 Welfare recipients lack the resources to
support themselves while they contest a deprivation of benefits.201 This inability to
provide for daily subsistence, the Court reasoned, made it difficult for the recipient to
seek redress at all.202
Finally, the Court held that not only would additional procedures, which included
a continuation of benefits until an evidentiary hearing, not be administratively or fis-
cally burdensome, they would actually be beneficial.203 This was so because providing
for private needs promoted the public’s interest in securing the welfare of all indi-
viduals within the state.204 To rectify the constitutional shortcomings, the Court ulti-
mately required something less than a full evidentiary hearing prior to termination.205
Essentially, the Court required simply that a recipient have “timely and adequate notice
detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, and an effective opportunity to defend
by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evi-
dence orally.”206 So long as these requirements were somehow satisfied, the deprivation
of benefits could withstand due process scrutiny.
In Mathews v. Eldridge,207 the Supreme Court considered a similar question when
a recipient of social security disability benefits challenged the Commissioner’s denial
of benefits without providing a pre-termination hearing.208 Relying upon Goldberg’s
three-pronged framework, the Court found this case distinguishable because the dis-
ability benefits recipient did not depend upon his benefits to the same degree as the
welfare recipient.209 Thus, under the circumstances, post-termination evidentiary hear-
ings adequately protected the recipient’s due process.
2. Post-Deprivation Hearings for Financial Institutions
Because the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be deprived of
“property . . . without due process of law,”210 a pre-deprivation hearing is generally
required.211 However, the Supreme Court has recognized that the public’s interest in
maintaining financial stability of the United States justifies a post-deprivation hearing
after the appointment of a receiver.212 In so holding, the Court noted that receivership
200 Id. at 264.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 265.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 266–67.
206 Id. at 267–68.
207 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
208 Id. at 323.
209 Id. at 335, 341–43.
210 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
211 See supra Part III.B.1.
212 See Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
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“is a heavy responsibility to be exercised with disinterestedness and restraint,” but
noted that the party challenging the adequacy of procedural due process had been
accorded the opportunity to contest a financial regulator’s decision to invoke its
receivership power during adversarial administrative hearings.213
In Collie v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board,214 a district court upheld as
constitutional the post-deprivation hearing rights of a savings and loan association
forced into receivership.215 In considering the adequacy of procedural due process,
the court noted the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation had determined
the association’s risk of insolvency after compiling a massive administrative record.216
Moreover, the association had numerous opportunities to contest this finding during
a series of administrative hearings.217 Thus, because the association had ample oppor-
tunity to defend its rights, specifically with respect to its solvency—a necessary pre-
condition to receivership—the agency’s determination was entitled to a presumption
of correctness.218
In First National Bank & Trust v. Department of Treasury,219 the Ninth Circuit
similarly upheld the constitutionality of procedures afforded to a bank subject to
receivership.220 In rejecting the bank’s constitutional claims that the Comptroller of
the Currency’s decision to implement receivership denied the bank an adequate oppor-
tunity to contest the agency’s findings, the court noted that the bank had a six-year
period in which to defend itself in a series of adverse examinations.221 At various
points, the bank had the opportunity to respond to the agency’s assertion that it vio-
lated cease-and-desist orders.222 Furthermore, the court had before it a voluminous
record on which to base its decision that the agency had accorded the bank with all the
due process to which it was entitled.223
Dodd-Frank technically does grant an institution a pre-deprivation hearing before
the district court once the FDIC invokes the OLA.224 Proponents of the OLA would
probably point to this fact and argue that an institution is better off because it gets the
benefit of a judicial hearing before receivership occurs. But this temporal juxtaposition
213 Id. at 253–54.
214 642 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
215 Id. at 1152.
216 Id. at 1149.
217 Id. at 1151.
218 Id.
219 63 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1233 (1996).
220 Id. at 899–900.
221 Id. at 898.
222 Id. at 895, 898.
223 See id. at 898–99 (“At every turn the Bank had the opportunity to respond to the
Comptroller’s concerns. The Bank received the Comptroller’s unfavorable examination
reports, it had discussions with Comptroller personnel, and prior to the conservator’s ap-
pointment, it was given the opportunity to respond to the Comptroller’s findings.”).
224 See 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(I) (2006).
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of hearing rights ignores the fact that an institution never has the opportunity at all
to contest a finding of systemic risk, nor does it account for the fact that the punitive
aspect of the statute coerces executives into acquiescence. Neither of these factors pre-
sented themselves in Collie or First National Bank and Trust.225 And in neither case
was the court required to pass on the agency’s decision inside of twenty-four hours.226
a. Corporations and Their Executives Have a Protected Property Interest at
Stake Under Orderly Liquidation Authority Proceedings
It cannot be seriously contended that corporations, corporate executives, and
corporate creditors do not have property interests at stake when the FDIC seeks to
exercise its liquidation authority. As a threshold matter, the protected property in-
terest at stake in Dodd-Frank’s OLA proceedings is materially distinguishable from
those in Goldberg227 and Mathews.228 In the latter cases, the protected property in-
terest was a financial benefit created by statute and provided by the government.229
In effect, the government sought to take away only that which it had provided.
By contrast, when the FDIC seeks to place a corporation into receivership, it seeks
to deprive a corporation and its stakeholders of property obtained wholly independent
of any government action.230 In practice, it is tantamount to placing a corporation into
summary involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy in order to dispose of its private property,
sometimes to the detriment of its creditors.231
In Board of Regents v. Roth,232 Justice Stewart remarked that, “[t]o have a prop-
erty interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or
desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead,
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”233
Without question, the corporate and individual interest in property that the FDIC
seeks to displace in orderly liquidation proceedings constitutes a “legitimate claim
225 See generally First Nat’l Bank & Trust v. Dep’t of Treasury, 63 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.
1995); Collie v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 642 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
226 See generally First Nat’l Bank & Trust, 63 F.3d at 894; Collie, 642 F. Supp. at 1147.
227 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits).
228 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (social security disability benefits).
229 Id. at 323; Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 255.
230 Unlike in Goldberg and Mathews, the government is not seizing property granted to
the corporation from the government. See 12 U.S.C. § 5381(b) (2006) (describing revenue
sources of financial companies covered by the OLA).
231 Chapter 7 bankruptcy actually provides the corporate debtor with more protection than
an OLA proceeding; in the former case, the debtor may obtain dismissal of the involuntary
bankruptcy petition if debts have been paid as they become due. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(2)
(2006). It therefore appears that the FDIC can simply override this traditional check on insol-
vency proceedings by invoking the more favorable OLA, which provides for no such require-
ment. See 12 U.S.C. § 5382 (2006).
232 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
233 Id. at 577.
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of entitlement,”234 the deprivation of which mandates the application of procedural
due process.
b. The FDIC’s Unilateral Determination of Systemic Risk and the
Concomitant Deferential Judicial Review of That Determination Creates
a Risk of Erroneous Deprivation of Protected Property Interests
A covered financial company’s, and the relevant corporate executives’, opportu-
nity for a hearing fails to satisfy basic notions of due process because the statutory
limitations on judicial review reduce the court’s role to a “rubber stamp.”235 “The
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard,”236 and
the hearing must be “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”237
OLA provides regulators with radical powers necessary to liquidate a company
that, pursuant to an ex ante determination of systemic risk, subjectively poses a dan-
ger of default.238 This is an uncomfortably low standard, particularly given the defer-
ential review. Whether a company qualifies as a financial company under Dodd-Frank
is readily discernable,239 but whether the company is in danger of default is not.240
At least, given the financial complexities of covered entities, it is not the type of find-
ing that directors and officers could effectively rebut inside of a twenty-four hour
secret hearing.
That the OLA limits judicial review to whether a company satisfies the definition
of a financial company and poses a danger of default underscores the contention that
receivership is all but a foregone conclusion. The FDIC will be accorded great latitude
in its determination on these two issues, both of which necessarily entail some statu-
tory interpretation.241 Thus, the FDIC should always—or nearly always—prevail, and
234 Id.
235 Horton, supra note 13, at 887–88.
236 Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
237 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
238 See 12 U.S.C. § 5383(a)(2) (2006).
239 See 12 U.S.C. § 5381(a)(11) (2006). The statute provides that a corporation will be con-
sidered a financial company when, inter alia, it is predominantly engaged in financial activ-
ities that account for at least eighty-five percent of its consolidated revenue. § 5381(b). Thus,
whether a company meets the statutory definition of a financial company should be objectively
ascertainable. See Cohen, supra note 182, at 1155–57 (describing the requirements for classi-
fication as a “financial company” under 12 U.S.C. § 5381).
240 See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text.
241 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding
agency interpretation of ambiguous statutory provision will be upheld if the interpretation is
permissible); see also Bankr. Estate of United Shipping Co., Inc. v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 34 F.3d
1383 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that deference to an agency decision is particularly appropriate
when the proceeding involves review of an agency’s interpretation of its own statute); Fort
Mill Tel. Co. v. FCC, 719 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that courts must defer to agency’s
decision if it is “supported by a rational basis in the record”).
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the judicial review of the FDIC’s determination represents a mere formality that fails
to satisfy the requirement that hearings be conducted in a “meaningful manner.”242
Logically, the FDIC’s determination that a company poses a systemic risk to the
financial condition of the United States is a central precondition to OLA’s application;
otherwise, the OLA would not be necessary. But the statute is notably silent with re-
spect to judicial review of this determination.243 Apparently, Congress appears to have
vested the FDIC with the unreviewable discretion to determine which companies are
systemically important and therefore subject to the OLA. To be sure, the FDIC will
defend its action on exactly those grounds.244
However, the fact that no explicit statutory grounds exist for directors or officers
to challenge this finding of systemic risk should not be preclusive.245 A finding of
systemic importance is so crucial to OLA’s application that there should be some
review of that finding, particularly given the stakes to corporations with multitudes
of stakeholders that stand to be adversely affected by the invocation of any resolution
authority.246 Indeed, some commentators believe that “[t]he prospect of stopping even
the most outrageous invocation of the new rules is close to nil. Once the company is
in resolution, the FDIC has total control.”247
The OLA’s effects are coercive with respect to the corporate executives; given the
specter of personal liability and the nearly insurmountable proceedings by which they
can avoid placing the company in receivership, the executives can always be expected
to acquiesce.248 But equally disconcerting is the coercive effect on the court; there is
simply no time for the court to conduct a meaningful review.249 Rather, the OLA abuses
the judicial review process as a mechanism to summarily ratify its earlier summary
proceedings and determinations.250
242 Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552.
243 See 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(2) (2006) (stating that judicial review, through all phases of ap-
peal, shall be limited to whether the agency’s determination that a company satisfies the defi-
nition of a financial company and is in default or danger of default is arbitrary and capricious).
244 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (stating that a reviewing court should set aside an agency
action except when the action is committed to agency discretion by law).
245 See Angleton v. Pierce, 574 F. Supp. 719, 729–30 (D.N.J. 1983), aff’d, 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984) (stating that judicial review is not completely foreclosed
by the fact that an agency decision is committed to its discretion by law, and that a reviewing
court must be able to consider whether the agency violated its constitutional mandate).
246 See Lee, supra note 25, at 774–75 (describing enhanced regulatory requirements for
“systemically important” institutions).
247 SKEEL, supra note 9, at 139.
248 See Cohen, supra note 182, at 1222 (describing the power of the Dodd-Frank Act over
executive officers).
249 See 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(v) (2006) (requiring judicial resolution within twenty-
four hours of receipt of petition).
250 See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1980) (“A Judiciary free from control
by the Executive and the Legislature is essential if there is a right to have claims decided by
judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of government.”).
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c. Additional or Substitute Procedural Requirements Would Be Neither
Unduly Burdensome Nor Unreasonably Expensive
The current procedural mechanisms inherently lack adequate constitutional safe-
guards of due process because the FDIC could employ additional procedures without
compromising OLA’s objectives. Whether “additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards [are required depends in part on the degree of] the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the addi-
tional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”251 Expanding the time allotted
for judicial review from twenty-four hours to something more manageable—say, three
days—should not be unduly burdensome or any more expensive. On the contrary, it
may actually alleviate the burden on already-constrained judicial resources.252
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY
During legislative debates prior to Dodd-Frank’s enactment, many critics believed
that ad hoc regulation too casually disregarded the rule of law.253 To them, the tradi-
tional bankruptcy process represented a desirable alternative as a “predictable, trans-
parent, [and] rule-oriented . . . process.”254 It may well be, and some observers have
recommended a new type of bankruptcy—Chapter 14—to deal with systemically
important financial institutions.255
Proponents point out that a Chapter 14 proceeding, based on the traditional bank-
ruptcy code, would reduce reliance on agency decisions (in this case, the FDIC) reached
behind closed doors.256 Additionally, private enforcement would necessarily supplant
governmental enforcement as creditors and counterparties would closely monitor trans-
actional risk-taking by the firm.257 Further, creditors could transact with a firm knowing
where they fall on the claim priority spectrum.258 Even if the government intervened in
order to acquire or guarantee claims, the process itself would be more transparent—and
thus subject the executive branch to political accountability—than would the OLA.259
251 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
263–71 (1970)).
252 See Catherine T. Struve, Time and the Courts: What Deadlines and Their Treatment Tell
Us About the Litigation System, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 601, 611 (2010) (“Short time limits on
court action . . . may limit courts’ ability to thoroughly consider the merits of a given matter.”).
253 SKEEL, supra note 9, at 10.
254 Id.
255 See Kenneth E. Scott, A Guide to the Resolution of Failed Financial Institutions: Dodd-
Frank Title II and Proposed Chapter 14, in RESOLUTION OF FAILED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS:
ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY AND A NEW CHAPTER 14, at 1-1 (2011), available at
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Resolution-Project-Booklet.pdf.
256 Id. at 1-7.
257 Id. at 1-3, 1-6.
258 Id. at 1-6.
259 Id. at 1-13.
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Others persuasively argue that Chapter 14 could be used to supplement or supplant
entirely the OLA, with the result that a clearly defined set of existing rules would pro-
vide creditors and other stakeholders with predictable allocation of losses in the event
of a company’s failure.260 In addition, the bankruptcy code provides an excellent start-
ing point because its procedures are robust and courts have systematically interpreted
its crucial provisions.261 Finally, and perhaps more importantly, the bankruptcy code
allows for either a liquidation or reorganization, depending on the circumstances.262
All of this procedure, of course, would be open to the public.
From a practical standpoint, replacing the OLA with the existing bankruptcy code
could be just as effective;263 perhaps Congress erred by departing from well-established
practice which provided those subject to its provisions with transparency, notice, and
other procedures commensurate with the rule of law. David Skeel points out that de-
spite popular notions to the contrary, bankruptcy worked rather well for Lehman.264
Two important observations undergird his assertion. First, bankruptcy law facilitated
Lehman’s sale to Barclays that would not have otherwise occurred outside bankruptcy,
particularly given Barclays’s reservations about some of Lehman’s illiquid assets.265
Second, Chapter 11 provided a speedy sale of Lehman’s viable assets.266 This shows
that in addition to providing the public and interested parties with constitutional guar-
antees of both access and due process, bankruptcy law can be equally effective as any
alternative. Consequently, this erodes the FDIC’s view that circumstances can justify
a secret and skewed process to deal with financial institutions.267
Assuming OLA’s superiority to bankruptcy from an economic-regulatory per-
spective, its provisions must be aligned with constitutional requirements. This is not
only possible, but readily achievable with minimal invasiveness to existing operative
provisions. In order to bring the OLA into constitutional conformity, Congress should
amend the statute in three ways.268 The first deals with a right of public access, while
the latter two are inexorably related and concern due process.
260 See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy Code Chapter 14: A Proposal, in RESOLUTION OF
FAILED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY AND A NEW CHAPTER 14,
at 2-1 (2011), available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Resolution
-Project-Booklet.pdf.
261 Id. at 2-4 to 2-5.
262 Id. at 2-5.
263 SKEEL, supra note 9, at 150 (noting that bankruptcy still allows for liquidation, but that
OLA’s mandatory liquidation “increases the potential for value to be squandered”).
264 Id. at 30.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Under the Dodd-Frank
Act, 5 FDIC Q. 31, 48 (2011) (arguing that the circumstances surrounding the Lehman Brothers
collapse would have been better suited to the OLA process).
268 Indeed, an outright repeal of Dodd-Frank is probably politically unachievable. See Scott,
supra note 255, at 1-13.
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First, Congress should allow public access to the hearing in which the district
court must determine whether to place a company into FDIC’s receivership. True,
markets may react if information of an orderly liquidation petition is made public.
However, as has been shown, market reaction may not be any more severe than if the
FDIC were to salvage the institution by infusing additional capital.269 Rather, the FDIC
should factor market reaction into its calculus when determining whether to invoke the
OLA in the first instance, thereby supporting OLA’s use only when its benefits out-
weigh its burdens.
Second, Congress must define “systemic risk to the financial condition of the
United States” within the meaning of § 5382.270 As a close corollary, it should also
expand judicial review to this finding as well. This would provide fair notice to all
participants and market predictability, and elevates judicial review beyond a mere
rubber stamp.
CONCLUSION
The Panic of 2008 represented the greatest financial catastrophe since the Great
Depression.271 Unsurprisingly, most legislators, regulators, and financial industry ob-
servers are in accord that these events mandated meaningful and impactful reforms.272
In retrospect, however, perhaps the urgency to act overpowered the need to reflect
on the cause of the crisis and the necessary steps that could be taken to avoid another.
The result was one that disregarded fundamental ideals of due process and access to
government in order to advance some compelling interest.
To be sure, financial institutions—both bank and non-bank alike—have become
too big to fail.273 Consequently, the survival (or at least the orderly failure) of these in-
stitutions is a compelling state interest when one firm’s failure can disrupt the entire
American economy. But an approach that allows regulatory bodies to disregard First
and Fifth Amendment rights in the name of dealing with systemic risk gives short
shrift to the importance of fundamental freedoms. This is particularly so when the
government takes a paternalistic approach when there are other viable (and existing)
alternatives to accomplish the same goals.
As previously discussed, bankruptcy can be an effective tool for expeditiously
dealing with a failing firm.274 Relying on existing bankruptcy law further provides
269 See supra notes 166–69 and accompanying text.
270 Cohen, supra note 182, at 1155 (noting that systemic risk determinations are made by
the Treasury Secretary and President and are “based on criteria that, for the most part, are not
subject to judicial review”).
271 Bruce Miller, The Place of Law in Ivan Illich’s Vision of Social Transformation, 34 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 507, 509 (2012).
272 See Porter, supra note 2, at 10.
273 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 182, at 1143, 1147 (noting that TARP funds were used to
bail out automotive manufacturers deemed “too big to fail”).
274 SKEEL, supra note 9, at 30 (noting that bankruptcy allowed Lehman to stay in business).
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benefits by providing market participants with a clear set of rules and procedure; if
nothing else, parties can forge transactions with some degree of certainty about what
type of law will apply, and when. If OLA is not any more effective than bankruptcy,
then there cannot be any good reason why it should have been enacted in order to
replace it. The glaring differences seem to be only truncated procedures and review,
more governmental discretion, secrecy, and mandated liquidation. It gives the ap-
pearance that government seeks a new authority in order to alter creditors’ rights and
influence the market with impunity, while mollifying those who demand some type
of government intervention to prevent market collapse.
